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Abstract 
This study evaluates shareholders’ wealth effects of international cross-listings and the joint significance 
of different theories in explaining American, British, and European cross-listing benefits. Moreover, it 
evaluates the time variation in shareholders’ wealth effects of cross-listings with a particular focus on 
the impact of significant developments in capital markets, such as adoption of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
in the US and single currency euro in Europe. The findings confirm that the impact of a cross-listing on 
shareholders’ wealth depends on the destination market and the time when it takes place. Changes in 
listing environment not only alter the wealth effects of cross-listings but also affect the sources of value 
creation around cross-listings. Overall, the findings provide insights into the nature of the motivations 
and the benefits of cross-listings across different host markets and over time. 
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Introduction 
The globalization and integration of the world financial markets, and in particular significant  capital 
market developments such as the introduction of Euro in the European Union in 1999, the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) and the introduction of Alternative Investments Market (AIM) of the London 
Stock Exchange in 1996 have generated a considerable debate among academics and practitioners 
concerning the motivations and the benefits of cross-listings of European companies on American, 
British and European stock exchanges
1
. With the introduction of common currency, euro, the European 
markets have become more integrated, creating doubts on whether cross-listings within Europe add any 
wealth to shareholders. Similarly, SOX is likely to increase the costs of meeting the legal and disclosure 
requirements of the US Securities and Exchange Commission, making listing in the US markets less 
desirable
2
. Finally, the introduction of AIM characterised with light disclosure requirements and easy 
access to capital is likely to affect the trend of the geography of cross-listings. The immediate 
consequence of these developments is that the motivations and the net benefits of cross-listings are 
likely to change across different listing destination markets and over time. This study contributes to this 
debate by investigating the wealth effect of cross-listing of European companies in American, British 
and European stock exchanges. 
Shareholders’ wealth effects of US cross-listings have been the subject of intensive theoretical and 
empirical research (Foerster and Karolyi, 1999; Miller, 1999). Mostly, prior studies on average uncover 
positive shareholders’ wealth gains of cross-listings on American stock exchanges. The conventional 
wisdom attributed shareholders’ wealth gains from cross-listing to market segmentation, liquidity and 
signalling theories. According to the market segmentation theory, a cross-listing in a foreign market 
makes company’s stocks accessible to investors who would otherwise find it less advantageous to hold 
the stocks because of investment barriers. In turn, this, potentially increases shareholder base, risk 
sharing, and leads in lower cost of capital and higher market valuation (Foerster and Karolyi, 1999; 
Errunza and Miller, 2000). According to the liquidity theory, cross-listing in a more liquid market 
reduces trading costs for investors and increase the company’s valuation (Amihud and Mendelson, 
1986; Foerster and Karolyi, 1998). Finally, a cross-listing may signal to the market the company’s high 
quality and future prospects (Fuerst, 1998). Later research by Stulz (1999) and Coffee (1999) challenged 
the adequacy of the aforementioned theories in explaining the variation of cross-listing valuation effects 
                                                 
1
 Some anecdotal evidence includes: “Delisting European companies should think twice before delisting from the 
US stock markets”, Financial Times, (April, 25, 2005); “Why cross-listing shares doesn’t create value”, McKinsey 
Quarterly, (November, 2008). 
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 In this respect, Litvak (2007) find a negative market reaction for companies that are subject to the SOX 
compliance during key announcements that SOX would fully apply to cross-listed foreign issuers. 
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and the time series pattern of cross-listings. As a result, other promising theories such as bonding, 
market timing and proximity preference were developed. The bonding theory proposes that cross-listing 
on an exchange with higher legal and disclosure standards ‘bonds’ the company to better corporate 
governance practices that limits the ability of managers and controlling shareholders to expropriate 
minority shareholders rights (Stulz, 1999; Coffee, 1999; Doidge et al., 2004). The market timing theory 
attribute cross-listing shareholders’ wealth gains to managers’ ability to time cross-listing in relatively 
‘hot’ host markets (Sarkissian and Shill, 2009b). Finally, the wealth effects of cross-listing could be 
positively related to the level of investors’ familiarity measured by geographic, economic, cultural, and 
industrial proximity between the home and the host markets (Sarkissian and Schill, 2004, 2009a). 
Overall, the abovementioned theories explain the cross-listing shareholders’ wealth effects at a market 
level; however, shareholders’ wealth effects may also vary at a company level. Thus, other researchers 
have put forth the business strategy theory. Assuming that cross-listing decision is associated with 
company’s global strategy, the business strategy theory predicts that the cross-listing shareholders’ 
wealth gains are a function of company-specific characteristics (Bancel and Mittoo, 2006).  
Empirically the joint significance of the aforementioned cross-listing theories is unclear. Yet, there is 
limited evidence on the impact of the developments in capital markets on the motivations and net 
benefits of cross-listings. Given that the capital market developments affect cross-listing shareholders’ 
wealth effects as does the conventional wisdom, failure to consider them might introduce spurious 
relations between the cross-listing shareholders’ wealth gains and their determinants suggested by the 
cross-listing shareholders’ wealth benefits theories. Furthermore, prior studies largely ignore cross-
listings on British and European stock exchanges. Since American, British and European stock 
exchanges have different characteristics with respect to the level of economic development, capital 
market size and liquidity, investor protection, and accounting standards, the motivations and the benefits 
of cross-listings across these markets are likely to diverge. Consequently, the joint significance of each 
of the aforementioned cross-listing shareholders’ wealth effects theories across the US, British and 
European cross-listings and, particularly, over time, is still a contentious issue in the literature, even 
after considering prior evidence on the US cross-listings. 
This study contributes to the cross-listing literature by investigating shareholders’ wealth effects of US, 
British and European cross-listings for European companies, the determinants of these effects and their 
evolution over time. It investigates the role of the following theories in explaining the variation of the 
wealth effects from cross-listing on American, British and European markets: market segmentation, 
liquidity, information disclosure, legal bonding, market timing, proximity preference, investor 
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recognition, and business strategy. Moreover, it considers the role of capital market developments on 
the cross-listing motivations and benefits. 
Using a hand-collected dataset of 254 cross-listing announcement events from 21 European markets 
during the period from 1982 to 2007 the results show an average statistically significant cumulative 
abnormal return of 1.8% around the announcement of an international cross-listing. Mostly, these 
abnormal returns concentrate in the US and British cross-listings (3.3% and 2.7%, respectively), as 
opposed to European listings that realize only insignificant cumulative abnormal returns. Moreover, this 
study also provides conclusive evidence that shareholders’ wealth impact of cross-listings and its 
determinants are affected by the capital market developments such as the introduction of Euro in 
Europe, the introduction of AIM by the London stock exchange and the adoption of SOX in the US. A 
cross-listing within Euro zone is more likely to result in the negative market reaction than a European 
cross-listing before the introduction of Euro. Furthermore, the sources of shareholders’ wealth creation 
before and after the introduction of Euro are different. Prior to the introduction of Euro, the market 
timing is the only empirically valid theory of shareholders’ wealth effect of cross-listing. In contrast, for 
foreign listings within Euro zone the market segmentation, the legal bonding, the proximity preference 
and the business strategy theories have significant explanatory power of the cross-sectional variation of 
the wealth effects. Concerning British cross-listings, the significant excess returns in 2000s are mainly 
contributed by the AIM listings, despite the fact that the AIM offers weaker investor protection than the 
Main Market of the London stock exchange. In turn, higher cumulative abnormal returns around the 
AIM listings can be attributed to the significantly smaller average size of companies listing on AIM. 
Overall, shareholders’ wealth effects of British listings can be explained by the legal bonding, the 
proximity preference and the business strategy theories. Finally, regarding the US cross-listings, the 
results are consistent with the argument that the costs from the adoption of SOX outweigh the benefits. 
More specifically, it is found that US cross-listings that take place before the adoption of SOX result in 
positive and statistically significant abnormal returns, while US cross-listings that take place after the 
adoption of SOX produce insignificant abnormal returns. Also, it is found that, positive shareholders’ 
wealth effects from US cross-listings before the adoption of SOX are particularly profound for small 
and growth companies, while after the adoption of SOX they are positive and significantly only for 
large companies from developed countries. Hence, the business strategy is the main empirically valid 
explanation of shareholders’ wealth effect of international cross-listings in the US market; while the 
investor recognition theory is also valid in the post-SOX period. Findings on the impact of AIM and 
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SOX on the market reaction to an international cross-listing suggest that investors evaluate the benefits 
of a foreign listing in conjunction with the costs involved. 
This study contributes to the literature on shareholders’ wealth effects of international cross-listings in 
following ways. First, it evaluates benefits from cross-listing on various host markets and compares 
their determinants. Second, it provides empirical evidence on the time variation in shareholders’ wealth 
effects of international cross-listings. Specifically, it evaluates how important capital markets 
developments in the last decade have altered the impact of cross-listings on shareholders’ wealth. 
Finally, it empirically evaluates joint significance of a number of theories on the wealth effects of 
international cross-listings and how their significance changes over time.  
 
Testable hypotheses 
Shareholders’ wealth effects of international cross-listings 
Based on the theoretical argument that a cross-listing improves stock accessibility to foreign investors 
(Merton, 1987; Errunza and Miller, 2000) and stock liquidity (Foerster and Karolyi, 1999) and in line 
with empirical evidence of Miller (1999), Serra (1999), and Roosenboom and Van Dijk (2009), 
international cross-listings are expected to result in excess positive stock returns. 
H1: An international cross-listing is associated with positive abnormal stock returns. 
Variation in shareholders’ wealth effects by host markets 
Theoretically, companies from low quality markets should experience shareholders’ wealth gains upon a 
cross-listing on a higher quality market. The quality of the market is characterised, among others, in 
terms of the level of capital market development, investor base size, liquidity, investor protection, and 
information environment. The markets of the US, UK and continental Europe differ from each other by 
the market qualities named above and these differences potentially cause diverse stock shareholders’ 
wealth effects to cross-listings on these markets. The US and the UK are English-law countries that 
focus on resolution of information asymmetry and have market-oriented financial systems. In contrast, 
the countries of continental Europe are civil-law countries with bank-oriented financial system and tax 
accounting rules. Empirically, several studies provide evidence on shareholders’ wealth effects of cross-
listings on various host markets. Mostly, foreign companies that list in the US on average experience 
significant positive abnormal returns (Foerster and Karolyi, 1999; Miller, 1999; Bris et al, 2007). 
However, evidence on shareholders’ wealth effect of foreign listings on British and European stock 
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markets is still limited and less conclusive. Serra (1999) and Salva (2003) document significant 
abnormal returns around the announcement of foreign listings on the London stock exchange, whereas 
Roosenboom and van Dijk (2009) find weaker abnormal returns on several European stock exchanges. 
H2.1: American listings results in the highest positive abnormal returns, followed by British listings 
and then by other European listing
3
. 
Change in shareholders’ wealth effects of international cross-listings over time 
Although empirical evidence on shareholders’ wealth impact of international cross-listings suggests that 
cross-listing benefits outweigh costs, there is a recent considerable debate among academics and 
practitioners on shareholders’ wealth effects of cross-listings of European companies. This debate is 
triggered by developments in financial markets such as the introduction of Euro in Europe, adoption of 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 in the US and the introduction of AIM in 1996 in the UK that are likely 
to affect both the motivations and the net benefits of cross-listings. Many argue that the introduction of 
Euro makes cross-listings on European stock exchanges unnecessary, while SOX imposes onerous costs 
on meeting the legal and disclosure requirements of the US Securities and Exchange commission, 
making American listings less desirable. Finally, the introduction of AIM of the London stock exchange 
facilitates easier access to capital for small companies and offer new investment products to the group of 
investors that do not put much value on regulation and disclosure, something that is likely to affect the 
geography of cross-listings (Jenkinson and Ramadorai, 2007). Consequently, these capital market 
developments possibly affect shareholders’ wealth gains of foreign listings and cross-listing 
motivations. This study investigates the price impact of international cross-listings during a broad 
period of time from 1982 to 2007. To control for the changes in listing environment over time, the 
sample is arbitrarily split into listings that take place before year 2000 and listings that take place in the 
2000s, assuming that each of these sub-periods reflects different levels of market integration and 
different listing, regulatory and trading environment. 
H3: Shareholders’ wealth effect of foreign listings on various host markets is significantly different 
for cross-listing events that take place before 2000s and in the 2000s. 
The impact of Euro, AIM, and SOX is further discussed in the following section on the determinants of 
shareholders’ wealth effect of international cross-listings. Arguably, not only these developments have 
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 This hypothesis, however, could be challenged by the proximity preference theory. According to the proximity 
preference theory, more significant positive shareholders’ wealth impact is expected from cross-listings in host 
markets that are closer geographically, i.e. within European markets in the context of this study. Which theory can 
explain the patterns in the wealth effects of cross-listings is an empirical question. Forthcoming Hypothesis H4.5 
addresses the Proximity preference argument. 
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altered cross-listing benefits but also have affected cross-listing motivations and, accordingly, the 
explanatory power of potential determinants of shareholders’ wealth effect of cross-listings. 
Determinants of shareholders’ wealth effects of cross-listings 
Market segmentation. Foerster and Karolyi, (1999) and Errunza and Miller (2000) argue that improved 
stock investability after the cross-listing increases shareholder base and risk sharing and, thus, leads to 
lower cost of capital. Empirically, Baele (2005) document an increasing level of global and particularly 
regional integration of European financial markets over time. 
H4.1a: Other things being equal, the higher the market segmentation between home and host 
markets the higher the abnormal returns around the cross-listing announcements. 
The level of global financial market integration, measured by the importance of the US common factors 
in explaining local European stock market returns, has increased significantly over time, however, to a 
lesser degree than the importance of European common factors (Fratzscher, 2002; Baele, 2005). The 
introduction of a single European currency in 1999 has eliminated currency risk and encouraged cross-
border equity trading within the Eurozone that resulted in more integrated European markets 
(Fratzscher, 2002; Galati and Tsatsaronis, 2003; Hardouvelis et al, 2006). 
H4.1b: The introduction of Euro had reduced the benefits of foreign listing within Eurozone. 
Legal bonding. Cross-listings on an exchange with stricter legal and disclosure standards bond the 
companies to respect minority shareholders’ rights
4
 (Coffee, 1999; Stulz, 1999), resulting in lower cost 
of capital for cross-listing companies. Doidge (2004) provides empirical support for the bonding theory 
that the voting premiums of cross-listed companies with dual shares are 43% lower than non-cross-
listed companies. The level of legal protection and the quality of disclosure standards vary in the 
international capital markets. US cross-listings are subject to increased enforcement by the US 
Securities and Exchange Commission, to more demanding litigation environment and to reconciliation 
of financial statements in accordance with US GAAP (Coffee, 2002). British cross-listings must comply 
with London Stock Exchange rules that are arguably less strict compared to those of NYSE (Baker et 
al., 2002). Finally, European cross-listings are subject to European legal and disclosure requirements 
that are considered the least strict (Coffee, 1999). 
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 Legal bonding theory has been a subject to criticism by Siegal (2005) and Burns et al (2007). In particular, Siegel 
(2005) argue that the Securities and Exchange Commission does not effectively enforce the law against cross-
listed foreign companies. 
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H4.2a: Other things being equal, the larger the difference in the level of investor protection between 
home and host markets the higher the abnormal returns around the cross-listing announcements. 
The introduction of AIM of the London Stock Exchange, a successful new market for smaller 
companies, provides a setting for further testing the legal bonding theory. In contrast to the Main 
Market of the London stock exchange, AIM imposes significantly reduced disclosure requirements
5
. 
H4.2b: Other things being equal, the market reaction to the announcement of Main Market listings is 
significantly higher compared to the market reaction to the announcement of AIM listings. 
In the US the level of investor protection has changed after the adoption of the SOX Act of 2002 that 
imposed even stricter disclosure and listing requirements for US public companies as well as to non-US 
companies that have chosen to list on a US exchange.  
H4.2c: Other things being equal, abnormal returns around a cross-listing on the US stock exchanges 
increase after year 2002 when SOX was adopted. 
Liquidity. A listing on a more liquid stock exchange enhances stock liquidity and, accordingly, 
improves stock’s market valuation (Amihud and Mendelson, 1986; Foerster and Karolyi, 1998). In 
contrast, Roosenboom and van Dijk (2009) find no relation between market-level liquidity and market 
reaction to foreign listings in any of the host markets examined. Empirical evidence suggests that 
liquidity in international capital markets varies widely (Huang and Stoll, 2001; Venkataraman, 2001). 
H4.3: Other things being equal, the larger the improvement in market liquidity between the host and 
the home markets the higher the abnormal returns around the cross-listing announcement. 
Investor recognition. According to Merton (1987), stock’s market valuation is positively related to the 
number of investors that are aware of the company. Listing shares on a foreign exchange facilitates 
easier access to company’s information and enhance company’s recognition abroad, which results in 
increased stock price for the cross-listing company (Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 2006). The level of 
investor recognition and stock visibility is directly related to the intensity of analyst coverage since, 
according to Baker et al (2002), analyst reports are the main source of firm-specific information for 
investors. Empirical evidence suggests that a cross-listing results in the increased attention of financial 
analysts for the US host market (Lang et al., 2003) as well as for  the UK host market, however, to a 
lesser degree (Baker et al., 2002). 
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 while some larger companies choose to list on AIM to avoid the regulatory burden of the Main Market 
(Jenkinson and Ramadorai, 2007), AIM is still predominantly the market for smaller and younger companies that 
are not qualified to list on the Main Market. 
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H4.4: Other things being equal, the larger the improvement in the intensity of analyst coverage 
between the host and the home markets the higher the abnormal returns around the cross-listing 
announcements. 
Proximity preference. Sarkissian and Schill (2004) show that geographical, economical, cultural, and 
industrial proximities are the important determinants of the corporate decision to cross-list. Further, 
Sarkissian and Schill (2009a) report that permanent decrease in cost of capital after the cross-listing is 
largely explained by higher investor familiarity with home market’s products and by geographic 
proximity. Geographic distance between the host and home markets is a distinctive characteristic of US, 
British and European listings by European companies. Thus, geographic distance as a potential 
determinant of the wealth effects around the cross-listing is particularly relevant for European 
companies. 
H4.5: Other things being equal, the smaller the geographic distance between the host and the home 
markets the higher the abnormal returns around the cross-listing announcements. 
Market timing. The market timing theory suggests that corporate finance managers time the company’s 
listing on a foreign exchange to take advantage of higher equity valuations in the host market. 
Relatively higher equity valuations in the host market may represent the differences in the level of 
economic development between the host and home countries. Indeed, Rajan and Zingales (2003) 
provide evidence that all countries exhibit uneven economic development over time, while Sarkissian 
and Shill (2009b) establish empirically the link between the frequency of international cross-listings and 
the level of economic and financial outperformance of the host country relative to the home country.  
H4.6a: Other things being equal, the larger the improvement in the level of economic performance 
between the home and the host markets the higher the abnormal returns around the cross-listing 
announcements. 
Further, it is likely that both host and home markets exhibit high equity valuations over certain periods 
of time. Thus, international stock markets were particularly ‘hot’ in the late 1990s, a period known as 
the Dotcom bubble (Ljungqvist and Wilhelm, 2003; Derrien, 2005). We examine the incremental 
shareholders’ wealth impact of foreign listings during the DotCom bubble as an additional test of the 
market timing theory.  
H4.6b: Cross-listing events during the bullish period of the Dotcom bubble of the late 1990s are 
associated with particularly high abnormal returns. 
10 
 
Business strategy. If cross-listing decision is related to the global corporate strategy then shareholders’ 
wealth impact of cross-listings should be a function of company-specific characteristics. One of the 
primary company characteristics, industrial affiliation, is named to be among the main motivations to 
cross-list (Bancel and Mittoo, 2001). Failure to follow cross-listed industry peers may put a company at 
a competitive disadvantage (Pagano et al., 2002; Mittoo, 2003). In this vein, Mittoo (2003) find 
significant industry variation in the wealth effects of American listings for Canadian companies.     
H4.7a: Other things being equal, there is a variation in industry abnormal returns around the cross-
listing announcements.  
Other company characteristics that likely affect the cross-listing shareholders’ wealth effects refer to 
growth opportunities and the need for external financing. Doidge et al. (2004) find a significant positive 
association between companies’ valuation, growth opportunities and the cross-listing status. Growth 
opportunities should be particularly pronounced if cross-listing companies raise new equity capital. In 
this respect, Charitou and Louca (2009) provide ex post evidence that capital-raising cross-listed 
companies outperform both the control sample of non-cross-listed companies and the sample of cross-
listed companies in pre-cross-listed period.  
H4.7b: Other things being equal, abnormal returns around the cross-listing announcements are 
positively related to the cross-listing company’ growth.  
H4.7c: Other things being equal, abnormal returns around the cross-listing announcements are higher 
for cross-listings that raise new equity capital. 
Other determinants of shareholders’ wealth effect of cross-listings 
Company size positively related to stock liquidity and visibility to investors. As such, a smaller 
company that makes a commitment to cross-list experiences larger incremental improvement in the 
level of liquidity and the quality of information environment compared to a larger cross-listing 
company. Similarly, first foreign listing yields more significant incremental change in stock’s 
accessibility to foreign investors compared to a consequent foreign listing, which is empirically 
confirmed by Sarkissian and Shill (2009a). Consequently, company size and listing order are expected 
to be inversely related to shareholders’ wealth impact of cross-listings. Lastly, often US OTC-traded
6
 
foreign stocks that are already accessible to US investors choose to up-grade to the US stock exchange 
listing in order to improve stock liquidity, visibility to investors, prestige, and the level of investor 
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 Level 1 ADRs or over-the-counter (OTC) listing is the easiest and fastest way to entry the US capital market. The 
main difference between OTC and exchange listings is the level of disclosure: an OTC listing requires nether full 
SEC registration and disclosure nor US GAAP reporting. 
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protection and, ultimately, stock’s market valuation. However, a US exchange listing involves 
additional substantial costs compared to an OTC listing. Accordingly, an up-grade from US OTC to the 
US stock exchange listing should result in a positive change in stock’s market valuation, however, to a 
lesser degree than a American listing without prior OTC. 
Table I summarized potential determinants of shareholders’ wealth effects of cross-listings and the 
direction of the expected impact on the stock price. 
 
Research design 
Shareholders’ wealth effects of international cross-listings 
Shareholders’ wealth effects from international cross-listings are measured by cumulative abnormal 
returns over the period 21-days (-10, 10) days around the announcement
7
 of the cross-listing. Abnormal 
returns are defined as market-adjusted returns: ARi,t = Ri,t – Rm,t, where ARi,t - abnormal returns of 
company i on day t; Ri,t - the return of company i on day t; ,m tR - market return on day t. Market returns 
are the corresponding Datastream Total Market index local currency returns for developed countries and 
Poland, and S&P/IFC market index local currency returns for the rest of emerging countries in the 
sample. The cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are the sum of abnormal stock returns over the event 
window. 
Variables definition 
Explanatory variables include three main groups: country, company and listing characteristics. 
Additionally, important capital market developments are used to capture the time varying cross-listing 
shareholders’ wealth effects. Both host market and home market characteristics affect the outcome of a 
cross-listing. In order to capture the difference or, more specifically, the improvement in the listing and 
trading environment after a cross-listing, country-level variables are constructed for each of the host-
home market pair combination in the sample as the difference/improvement in a particular 
characteristic. Table II contains definitions and data sources of all the variables. 
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 Under the assumption of market efficiency, stock prices incorporate all information available on the market and 
stock price adjustment to cross-listing accrues when the news about company’s intention to cross-list is released to 
the market. Thus, wealth effects of cross-listings are expected to be concentrated around the cross-listing 
announcement. 
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The level of market segmentation between the home and host markets is measured by the correlation of 
the host and home market returns, similar to Sarkissian and Schill (2004) and Roosenboom and van Dijk 
(2009). The increased level of market integration in Europe after the introduction of Euro is captured by 
a dummy variable that represents listings within Euro zone. The validity of the legal bonding theory is 
investigated using several proxies. First, we use the improvement from the cross-listing in country-level 
accounting standards index from La Porta et al (1998). Second, we use the improvement in legal index, 
calculated as the product of the anti-director rights index from Djiankov et al (2007) multiplied by the 
rule-of-law index from Kaufmann et al (2005). Legal index reflects both de jure, which by itself is not 
sufficient, and de facto aspects of investor protection. Liquidity benefit of a cross-listing is quantified by 
the improvement in the market-level liquidity measured by the market turnover ratio, i.e. the ratio of the 
DataStream Total Market index capitalization to the value of the index’s trading volume. Improved 
investor recognition is measured by the improvement in country-level analyst coverage intensity, 
estimated as the average number of analysts per company for each country-year in the sample. 
Geographic proximity is quantified by the distance in kilometres between the capital cities of the host 
and home markets as in Sarkissian and Shill (2004). Similar to Sarkissian and Shill (2009b), the 
marking timing theory is tested whether shareholders’ wealth impact of a cross-listing is related to the 
difference in the level of economic performance between the host and home countries. Economic 
performance is measured by the 3-year moving average of the GDP per capita using data obtained from 
the United Nations statistics division web-site. Additionally, it is evaluated whether a foreign listing 
during the DotCom bubble had any valuation premium due to the high level of investor sentiment, as 
predicted by the market timing theory. In line with Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003), a ‘bubble’ dummy 
variable is used for foreign listings that took place in 1999 and in the beginning of 2000. To test the 
Business strategy theory, several firm-level variables are obtained. First, a company’s industry is 
defined based on FTSE/DJ industry firm-level classification obtained from DataStream
8
. Second, 
company growth is measured by the three-year sales growth preceding the listing. Lastly, data on capital 
raising activity on the foreign market following the cross-listing are obtained from several sources 
including BNY and Citibank ADRs databases and Thomson One Banker Equity Deals database. Finally, 
company size is measured by company market capitalization, listing order - by first foreign listing 
dummy variable and presence of OTC listing prior to US stock exchange - by prior-OTC dummy 
variable. 
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 In order to reduce the number of industry-based sub-groups with small number of observations companies from 
Basic materials, Consumer goods, or Industrials industry groups are combined into one group ‘Manufacturers’, 
and Oil & Gas and Utilities – into one group ‘Natural resources’. 
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Multivariate regression analysis 
The aim of this study is to evaluate the validity of alternative theories of shareholders’ wealth effects of 
cross-listing for different host markets and over time. A problem with implementing regression analysis, 
however, is potentially high correlations among the explanatory variables, specifically, the levels of 
investor protection, accounting disclosure, and economic development of a particular host country. Even 
though the explanatory country-level variables represent the differences in country characteristics of the 
host and home countries, they are primary driven by the characteristics of the common host market. 
Therefore, host-market-adjusted explanatory variables are constructed in order to mitigate potential 
multicollinearity problem. They are estimated as the residuals from the following regression: Varj = 
Σn=EU,UK,US βn Hostn + εj, where Varj- an explanatory variable (market correlation, improvement in 
accounting standards, improvement in legal investor protection, improvement in GDP per capita, 
geographic proximity, and company size), Hostn - host market dummy variable. The error term εj is the 
host-market-adjusted explanatory variable. 
In order to evaluate the join significant of alternative hypotheses the following regression is estimated: 
CARi = Σn=EU,UK,US βn Hostn + Σj Σn=EU,UK,US βj,n (Hostn Xi,j) + εi, where Xi,j - an explanatory 
variable or, in case of market correlation, improvement in accounting standards, improvement in legal 
investor protection, improvement in GDP per capita, geographic proximity, and company size variables, 
- a host-market-adjusted variable. 
In order to evaluate the impact of the important changes in listing environment on shareholders’ wealth 
effects of international cross-listings and on the explanatory power of the determinants of shareholders’ 
wealth effects of cross-listings, the following regressions are estimated. 
Impact of Euro introduction: 
CARi=Σn=EU,UK,US βnHostn+ΣDeuroβEU,Deuro(HostEU Xi,j Deuro)+Σj Σn=UK,US βj,n (Hostn Xi,j)+εi  
Impact of SOX adoption: 
CARi=Σn=EU,UK,US βnHostn+ΣDsoxβUS,Dsox(HostUS Xi,j DSOX)+Σj Σn=EU,UK βj,n (Hostn Xi,j)+εi  
where Xi,j - an explanatory variable or, in case of market correlation, improvement in accounting 
standards, improvement in legal investor protection, improvement in GDP per capita, geographic 
proximity, and company size variables, - a host-market-adjusted variable; Deuro - one of two dummy 
variables related to Euro introduction – DbeforeEuro and DEurozone; DSOX - one of two dummy variables 
related to SOX adoption - DbeforeSOX  and DafterSOX. 
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The dataset 
The sample consists of the US, British and European cross-listings of European companies during the 
period from 1982 to 2007. The initial dataset includes companies from all European markets available in 
Datastream that have their stock listed on one or more stock exchange outside of their home market. 
This dataset is cross-checked and supplemented by cross-listing data from major stock exchanges web-
sites that attract listings of European companies: NYSE, NASDAQ, AMEX, LSE, Euronext, Frankfurt 
stock exchange, Irish stock exchange, Swiss stock exchange, Borsa Italiana, Luxembourg stock 
exchange. Data on ADRs comes from the Bank of New York and Citibank ADR databases. The sample 
is also supplemented with information on foreign listings from Sarkissian and Shill (2004, 2009b) and 
Factiva news database. Based on this sample, we search for the cross-listing announcements in Factiva 
news database. Preference stock listings are excluded from the analysis. Also, to make the results 
comparable between US and European listings, OTC and Portal listings are excluded, i.e. the sample 
consists of stock exchange listings only. Finally, we exclude direct IPOs in a foreign country and 
companies without return data 10 days before and 10 days after the announcement date available in 
Datastream.  
The final sample consists of 254 cross-listing announcements by 210 companies that take place on three 
US exchanges (AMEX, NASDAQ, and NYSE), two markets of the UK’s LSE (Main Market and AIM) 
and seventeen other European exchanges. Table III presents frequency distribution of the cross-listing 
announcement events in the sample by host and home country and by the period of time. The US host 
market listings constitute 40.9% of the sample, while the UK host market – 18.9%. Three largest home 
markets presented are the UK (20.1% of the sample observations), Germany (14.6%) and France 
(9.8%); the primary listing destination market for these home markets is the US. The UK host market is 
the main listing venue for companies from Ireland and Russia. 
 
Empirical Results 
Shareholders’ wealth effects of an international cross-listing 
Consistent with the hypothesis H1 that a cross-listing increases shareholders’ wealth, it is found that, on 
average, European companies experience positive and statistically significant at 1% excess returns of 
1.8% during the 21 working days around the announcement of a cross-listing with 52.0% of the cross-
listing announcement events resulting in positive cumulative abnormal returns (Table V). Generally, the 
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magnitude of the average stock price reaction around the announcement of foreign listing detected in 
this study is lower than reported in earlier studies that used samples of US cross-listing events that take 
place before year 2000
9
. This is possibly due to variation in the wealth effects among different host 
markets and also due to important changes in the listing environment that took place in the 2000s and 
have affected motivations and outcomes of cross-listings. 
Variation in shareholders’ wealth effects by host markets 
Shareholders’ wealth effects of cross-listings for various host markets are expected to vary due to the 
differences in host market characteristics. Accordingly, before examining the variation in shareholders’ 
wealth effects around cross-listings by host markets it is necessary to compare empirically market 
characteristics of the host markets in the sample. Table IV reports capital market size, liquidity, the level 
of information environment, disclosure, legal protection and economic development for the three host 
markets: Europe (excluding the UK), the UK and the US. As expected, the US market stands out by the 
superior level of economic development, stock market size and liquidity, and analyst coverage intensity. 
The UK follows the US in ranking by the level of economic development and by stock market size and 
liquidity. Contrary to the argument that the US has the highest level of disclosure and investor 
protection, it is found that, based on the accounting index from La Porta et al, anti-director rights index 
from Djiankov et al (2007), and the rule-of-law index from Kaufmann et al (2005), the UK has higher 
level of disclosure and investor protection compared to the US. European markets (excluding the UK), 
on average, are significantly smaller, less liquid, with lower level of economic development and lower 
quality of accounting disclosure compared to both the UK and the US markets. The quality of 
information environment, proxy by analyst coverage intensity, however, is the lowest in the UK, while 
high level of analyst coverage intensity in France, Germany and Netherlands contributes to the higher 
average information environment quality in Europe relative to the UK. 
Table 2.6 reports excess returns around the cross-listing announcement and around the cross-listing 
event for the subsamples by host and home markets. Foreign listings within Europe do not have an 
impact on stock price nether around the announcement nor around the cross-listing event. British 
listings have a positive impact on the stock price - CARs during the 21 days around the cross-listing 
announcement are 2.7% significant at 5%. American listings result in positive and statistically 
significant excess returns around the cross-listing announcement (mean 3.3%) and during 3-months (-
                                                 
9
 For example, Foerster and Karolyi (1999) report the average daily abnormal returns of 0.35% around the cross-
listing day. Also, Miller (1999) reports a positive abnormal return of 2.63% on the announcement of a US stock 
exchange listing. 
16 
 
2,0) months event window around the cross-listing event (mean 1.8%). These findings are consistent 
with hypothesis H2.1 that US cross-listings have most profound positive impact on stock price, 
followed by British cross-listings and then by other European listings. 
Change in shareholders’ wealth effects over time 
Table VI reports excess returns around the cross-listing announcement and around the cross-listing 
event for the subsamples by different periods of time. For the total sample, cross-listing announcement 
abnormal returns are positive for events that take place before year 2000 (mean 1.3% significant at 5%) 
and in the 2000s (mean 2.5% significant at 10%). Lower statistical significance of abnormal returns for 
the 2000s subsample is driven by larger variation in individual CARs and outliers; further, only 48.5% 
of the cross-listing events from the 2000s result in positive abnormal returns around the announcement. 
European cross-listings. Cross-listings within Europe have no positive shareholders’ wealth effects for 
different subsample by period of time (Table VI). Moreover, European cross-listings in the 2000s are 
associated with significant negative returns (median) with only 37.5% of cross-listing stocks 
experiencing positive returns during 21 days around the cross-listing announcement. Supportive of the 
hypothesis H4.1b that the Euro introduction reduces the benefits of European listing, it is found that 
cross-listings within Eurozone are more likely to generate negative cumulative abnormal returns than 
European cross-listing before the euro introduction. However, statistical significant of this result is 
weak. 
British cross-listings. It is found that a cross-listing in the UK has positive and statistically significant 
shareholders’ wealth effects only in the 2000s: mean 5.1% significant at 5% around the cross-listing 
announcement. Shareholders’ wealth effects of cross-listing events that take place before year 2000 are 
statistically insignificant. Further analysis of CARs by Main Market and AIM of the London stock 
exchange reveals that positive shareholders’ wealth effects from cross-listings in the UK are driven by 
AIM listings. Contrary to the theoretical predictions (Hypothesis H4.2b), CARs around announcement 
of listing on AIM are 8.4% significant at 10% while CARs around announcement of listing on the Main 
Market are insignificant. Striking is the difference in types of companies that list on AIM and the Main 
Market: the average company value of AIM company in the sample is £17 million, while the average 
market value of the Main Market company - £844 million. Thus, potentially, the difference in excess 
returns between AIM and the Main Market listings is driven by company size. 
US cross-listings. Announcement of a cross-listing in the US yields positive and statistically significant 
abnormal returns of around 3% both before and after year 2000; however, this number is statistically 
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significant only for American listings that take place before year 2000. Further analysis of CARs before 
and after SOX introduction reveals that US cross-listings before SOX adoption yield positive abnormal 
returns of 3.4% significant at 1%. For the post-SOX subsample cross-listing announcement CARs are 
positive but insignificant, with negative median of -0.8% significant at 5% level. This finding 
contradicts theoretical predictions (Hypothesis H4.2c) that SOX increases the benefits from US cross-
listings due to enhanced investor protection. While Sarbanes-Oxley Act improves minority investor 
protection, it also tremendously increases the costs for listing companies, which can explain the negative 
contribution of SOX to shareholders’ wealth impact of American listings
10
. This finding is in line with 
the argument of Zingales (2007) that for many foreign companies disclosure and compliance costs after 
SOX adoption outweigh the benefits from a cross-listing in the US. Due to significant fixed costs 
associated with the US cross-listing after the adoption of SOX it is possible that the negative effect of 
SOX is more profound for smaller companies.  
Overall, there is strong empirical support for the hypothesis H3 that wealth effects of cross-listings on 
various host market varies over time. Furthermore, results of univariate analysis of the time-specific 
patterns of shareholders’ wealth effects provide only weak support to the market segmentation theory 
and no support to the legal bonding theory. Importantly, the results highlight the relevance of the 
changes in listing environment in explaining the wealth benefits of cross-listings. The forthcoming 2.6.5 
section on the change of the explanatory power of the determinants of shareholders’ wealth effects of 
cross-listings over time continuous the discussion on how the introduction of euro in Europe and the 
adoption of SOX in the US have affected the sources of wealth around from cross-listings. 
Determinants of shareholders’ wealth effects of cross-listings 
This section discusses the findings on the potential determinants of shareholders’ wealth effects of 
cross-listings that are derived from various theoretical explanations. Expected impact of the 
determinants is summarised in Table I, while the variables are defined in Table II. 
Summary statistics  
Panel B of Table V reports summary statistics - number of observations, mean, median, and percentage 
of positive observations, of the explanatory and control variables. As expected, correlations between the 
host and home market returns, the measure of market segmentation, are the highest for listings within 
Europe (mean 0.66). In contrast to the argument that companies cross-list to bond to better legal 
                                                 
10
 In this vein, Zhang (2007) and Litvak (2007) find significant negative abnormal returns around events leading to 
the passage of SOX and around announcements indicating that the Act will apply to cross-listed foreign 
companies. 
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environment, it is found that overall less than 50% of cross-listing events in the sample result in 
improvement in legal environment, quantified by both proxies for legal bonding, legal index and 
accounting standards index. The largest average improvement in legal environment occurs for British 
cross-listings: 68.8% and 97.2% of these listings result in exposure to higher accounting standards and 
better legal protection respectively. Regarding market liquidity,  summary statistics shows that on 
average companies cross-list their stocks in more liquid market compared to the home market as the 
improvement in market liquidity variable has positive mean and median (0.72 and 0.30 respectively) 
and 65.2% of observations being positive. However, an improvement in liquidity mostly comes from 
British and American listings (81.8% and 80.0% share of positive observations respectively) and 
significantly less from European listings (only 38.4% of observations are positive). Even though the US 
is the most liquid host market in the sample (as reported in Table 1.4 and discussed in section 5.2.1), the 
largest improvement in liquidity occurs for British listings. Investor recognition is proxied by the quality 
of information environment, measured by country-level analyst coverage intensity. Table V reports that 
around half of cross-listing events in the sample result in improvement in information environment, with 
British and American listings resulting in improvement in information environment more frequently 
(around 54% positive observation for British and American listings vs. 43% for European listings). The 
largest improvement in analyst coverage intensity occurs for British listings. Regarding proximity 
between the host and the home markets, the US host market stands out by the average geographic 
distance between the capitals of the host and home markets – 6,286 km vs. 632 km and 707 km mean 
geographic distance for European and British listings respectively. Market timing is measured by 
improvement in GDP per capita between the host and home markets and also by DotCom bubble 
dummy variable. On average, companies cross-list their stocks in more developed markets, measured by 
GDP per capita, compared to the home market as indicated by positive mean and median of GDP per 
capita variable (0.21 and 0.12 respectively) with 69.7% of the observations being positive. Particularly, 
the improvement in GDP per capita is significant for American listings, 97.1% of which are associated 
with an improvement in the level of economic development. Furthermore, 8% of European cross-
listings and 12% of the US cross-listings in the sample take place during the DotCom bubble. Regarding 
business strategy, cross-listing companies, on average, experience significant growth preceding the 
cross-listing: mean and median corporate sales growth for the total sample is 68% and 27% respectively. 
Also, on average 22% of cross-listings involve raising new equity capital; the percentage of capital-
raising listings is the highest for the US subsample (30%). Company size, measure by market 
capitalization of the cross-listing stock, varies widely from 3.75 million GBP to 85.4 billion GBP. As 
expected, larger companies cross-list in the US (2.45 billion GBP median company size), while smaller 
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companies choose the UK (0.6 billion GBP median company size). Furthermore, 53% of the cross-
listing events in the sample are the first foreign listings (as opposed to consequent listings); the 
percentage of the first foreign listings is the highest for the UK subsample (69%). Lastly, Table V 
indicates that 28% of American listings have had OTC trading in the US prior the US stock exchange 
listing. 
Multivariate regression analysis  
Table VII reports the estimation results of regressions of CARs for 21-days (-10,10) days event window 
around the cross-listing announcement on a number of potential determinants of shareholders’ wealth 
effects of cross-listings for base model specification (Models 1 and 2) and extended specification that 
includes interaction variables of the explanatory variables with host market dummy variables. 
Market segmentation. Table VII reports that market correlation between the host and home market 
returns are negatively related to shareholders’ wealth effects of cross-listings; however, this relationship 
is not statistically significant for the total sample (model 1). Based on the output of models 3 and 4 
(Table VII), for European listings market correlations are a positive and significant determinant of 
CARs while for American listings – negative and statistically significant. The result for American 
listings is consistent with theoretical argument related to international portfolio diversification benefits 
and the market segmentation theory (Hypothesis H4.1a), while the result for European listings can be 
interpreted as in line with the proximity preference theory rather than the market segmentation theory. 
Legal bonding. Improvement in legal environment is a positive determinant of shareholders’ wealth 
effects of cross-listings in models 1 and 2 (Table VII) where legal environment is quantified by legal 
index. This relationship is particularly significant for British listings in models 3 and 4 (Table VII) 
where the legal environment is proxy by the accounting standards. These findings are supportive of 
Hypothesis H4.2a. 
Liquidity. Based on the liquidity theory of shareholders’ wealth effects of cross-listings, improvement in 
market liquidity should be associated with positive abnormal returns. However, no empirical evidence is 
found to support the hypothesis H4.3 as market liquidity improvement variable in the multivariate 
regressions has insignificant or negative coefficients (Table VII).  
Investor recognition. Also opposite to expectations (Hypothesis H4.4), improvement in analyst coverage 
intensity variable has insignificant or negative coefficients (Table VII).  
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Proximity preference. Supportive of Hypothesis H4.5, geographic distance is negatively related to 
CARs around the cross-listing announcement for the total sample and sub-sample by host market; this 
relationship is statistically significant for the total sample (models 1 and 2, Table VII).  
Market timing. Improvement in GDP per capital is a positive but statistically insignificant determinant 
of shareholders’ wealth effects of cross-listings. Another proxy for the market timing theory of 
shareholders’ wealth effects of international cross-listings, DotCom bubble dummy variable, has 
positive coefficient estimates for all sub-sample, and statistically significant for the total sub-sample 
(model 1, Table VII). These findings provide support to hypotheses H4.6a and H4.6b. 
Business strategy. Consistent with the expectations (Hypothesis H4.7a), Table VII shows that there is a 
significant variation in CARs depending on the company’s industry. Companies from natural resources 
sector industry experience positive and statistically significant at least at 5% abnormal returns around 
the cross-listing. Supportive of Hypothesis H4.7b, sales growth is found to be a positive and significant 
predictor of the cross-listing CARs only for British and American listings (model 4). Also Table VII 
reports that capital raising activity in the foreign market is positively and statistically significantly 
associated with CARs only for British listings (models 3 and 4), consistent with Hypothesis H4.7c.  
Other determinants. Consistent with expectations, Table VII reports that smaller companies experience 
larger CARs around the cross-listing announcement. This result is particularly strong both by the 
magnitude and statistical significance for British cross-listings (models 3 and 4). Contrary to 
expectations and findings of univariate analysis, first foreign listing variable is insignificant in 
multivariate regression (Table VII). Finally, prior-OTC variable, which indicates that the stock had been 
traded on OTC market in the US prior to the exchange listing, has a negative coefficient, in line with 
expectations, but statistically insignificant. 
To summarize, analysis of the joint significance of the potential determinants of shareholders’ wealth 
effects of cross-listings for the total sample reveals that improvement in legal environment, listing 
during DotCom bubble and the company’s affiliation with natural resources industry are the positive 
and significant determinants, while geographic distance and company size are the negative and 
significant determinants. Therefore, there is empirical confirmation of the following theories on 
shareholders’ wealth effects of cross-listings on various host markets: legal bonding, market timing, 
proximity preference and business strategy. Even after controlling for the potential determinants, host 
UK and host US dummy variables have positive and statistically significant coefficient estimate that can 
be interpreted as in line with the signalling theory of shareholders’ wealth effects of cross-listings 
(Fuerst, 1998). Furthermore, multivariate analysis of the determinants by host market reveals that 
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correlation between the host and home market returns is the positive and significant determinant of 
CARs around European listing; improvement in legal environment, company growth and capital raising 
activity (positive) and company size (negative) are significant determinants of CARs around British 
listings. This means that market segmentation, legal bonding and business strategy are empirically valid 
explanations of shareholders’ wealth effects of British cross-listings. Finally, correlation between the 
host and home market returns (negative) and company growth (positive) are found to be significant 
determinants of CARs around American listings. In other words, shareholders’ wealth effects of 
American listings can be explained by market segmentation and business strategy theories. 
Change of the explanatory power of the determinants over time 
Arguably, significant capital market developments, such as Euro introduction in the EU and the 
adoption of SOX in the US, have changed cross-listing net benefits and have affected the determinants 
of shareholders’ wealth effects of cross-listing. In addition to the univariate analysis of the variation of 
excess returns over time, the impact of Euro and SOX is evaluated using multivariate regression 
analysis
11
. The output is reported in Tables VIII and IX accordingly. 
Impact of Euro on the determinants of the wealth effects of European cross-listings 
Table VIII reports that, the determinants of shareholders’ wealth effects of foreign listings differ 
significantly for European cross-listings that take place before and after introduction of Euro. Before 
Euro introduction, only listing in a foreign country with higher level of economic development is 
associated with significant change in stock’s market price. While shareholders’ wealth impact of cross-
listings within Euro zone can be explained by the improvement in legal environment that contributes 
positively and by market correlation between the host and home market returns and geographic distance 
that contribute negatively; also smaller and higher-growth stocks have higher CARs around the cross-
listing announcement within Euro zone. 
Impact of SOX on the determinants of shareholders’ wealth effects of the US cross-listings 
The most significant determinant of the price reaction to American listing before SOX introduction is 
company size (negative contribution), i.e. smaller stocks have experienced larger abnormal returns 
around the cross-listing. Also, CARs before SOX introduction are positively related to the company 
growth and are higher for listings that took place during the bullish period of the DotCom bubble. The 
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 Multivariate regression analysis on the impact of AIM would be statistically unreliable due to the limited 
number of AIM listing events in the sample. 
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significant determinants of shareholders’ wealth effect of American listing after SOX adoption are 
completely different. In contrast, larger companies from developed countries experience abnormal 
positive returns around announcement of listing in the US after year 2002, which is in line with findings 
of Litvak (2008) that SOX particularly negatively affects smaller and riskier companies and companies 
from countries with strong investor protection. It is also found that improvement in legal environment is 
a positive factor contributing to cross-listing CARs after SOX adoption. Finally, an exchange listing in 
the US that takes place after SOX adoption negatively affects stock price for companies that have had 
their stock traded in the US OTC market prior to the exchange listing as suggested by the negative and 
significant at 5% coefficient estimate on the ‘prior US OTC’ dummy variable. 
The empirical evidence confirms that shareholders’ wealth effects of international cross-listings change 
over time subject to important capital market developments that affect listing and trading environment. 
More specifically, shareholders’ wealth effects of foreign listing and the explanatory power of its 
determinants are affected by the introduction of Euro for European foreign listings, the introduction of 
AIM
12
 for British foreign listings and the adoption of SOX for the US foreign listings. 
Overall, the empirical results on the determinants of wealth effects of the cross-listings indicate the 
following. The market segmentation theory holds only for American listings and cross-listings within 
Euro zone. Although less than half of cross-listings in the sample take place on the market with legal 
environment better than that of the home market, it is found that, in line with the legal bonding theory, 
the improvement in investor protection contributes to the positive abnormal returns around a cross-
listing. This relationship particularly holds for British listings and listings within Euro zone. Liquidity 
improvement via a cross-listing on a more liquid market seems to be a considerable motivation of the 
cross-listing decision. However, the degree of the improvement in market liquidity cannot explain 
shareholders’ wealth effects of a cross-listing, i.e. there is no empirical support for the liquidity theory 
for neither of the host markets in the sample. An improvement in information environment determines 
positive shareholders’ wealth effects of a cross-listing, supportive of the investor recognition theory, 
only for American listings that take place after the SOX adoption. Geographic distance is a significant 
negative determinant of shareholders’ wealth effects of cross-listing, in line with the proximity 
preference theory, particularly, for the Euro zone listings and for British listings. It is found that a cross-
listing on the market that economically outperforms the home market and on the market during the 
period of high investor sentiment, i.e. ‘hot’ market, is associated with an increase in stock shareholders’ 
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 The impact of AIM is evaluated using unvariate analysis only due to insufficient number of observations for 
multivariate analysis. Accordingly, no conclusions on the impact of AIM on the explanatory power of the 
determinants of the value effects of cross-listing can be drawn. 
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wealth, supportive of the market timing theory. In line with the business strategy theory, it is found that 
a significant variation in the abnormal returns around cross-listing can be explained by the firm-specific 
factors: high-growth companies, companies associated with natural resources industries and companies 
that raise new equity capital in the UK experience higher positive returns around the cross-listing 
announcement. Finally, company size is found to be a significant negative determinant of the market 
reaction to foreign listing, particularly, for Eurozone listings, for the AIM listings and for American 
listings that take place before the SOX adoption. Noticeably, company size becomes a positive 
determinant of shareholders’ wealth effects of cross-listing for American listings that take place after the 
adoption of SOX, which can be attributed to the relatively higher costs of compliance with SOX for 
smaller companies. In the same way, higher listing and compliance costs of the US exchange listing 
after the adoption of SOX can explain the negative contribution to shareholders’ wealth effects of an up-
grade from an OTC listing to an exchange listing in the US. 
 
Conclusions 
This study compares shareholders’ wealth effects of foreign listings in the US, in the UK and within 
Europe by European companies and examines the determinants of the cross-sectional variation of these 
effects. First, it is empirically shown that international cross-listings have a positive and significant 
impact on shareholders’ wealth of around 1.8% cumulative abnormal returns during 21 around the 
cross-listing announcement. Second, it is shown that shareholders’ wealth effects of cross-listing vary 
significantly among the destination markets. A cross-listing in the US market, which is the most 
economically and financially developed, liquid and information-rich market in the sample, results in the 
largest stock price increase – around 3.3% CARs around the cross-listing announcement. It is followed 
by a cross-listing in the UK that results in, on average, 2.7% CARs around the announcement; while a 
cross-listing within Europe has an insignificant effect on the stock price. 
Third, the study contributes to the literature by evaluating how shareholders’ wealth effects around 
cross-listings change over time. No evidence is found that average excess returns around an 
international cross-listing are diminishing over time. However, there is evidence found of the increased 
variation in the cross-listing shareholders’ wealth effects after year 2000. Thus, a cross-listing in the US 
yields positive and significant excess returns if it takes place before year 2000 and insignificant returns 
if it takes place in the 2000s. In contrast, a British cross-listing generates positive and significant 
abnormal returns for the listing company only if it takes place in the 2000s. These findings are in line 
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with the argument of Zingales (2007) that the US capital market is losing its competitive edge. 
European listings, however, both before and after the year 2000, on average, have no impact on the 
stock returns. Nevertheless, European listings that take place in the 2000s are more likely to generate 
losses for shareholders of the cross-listing company. Time-specific variation in shareholders’ wealth 
effects are driven by the significant capital market developments in Europe, the UK and the US. 
Empirically, no evidence is found that the introduction of the Euro affects shareholders’ wealth impact 
of a cross-listing within Europe. In contrast to the expectations, it is found that significant positive 
excess returns around British listings in recent years are driven by the excess returns around AIM 
listings, while the excess returns around Main Market listings are insignificant. Lastly, in contrast to the 
legal bonding argument, it is found that SOX negatively affects shareholders’ wealth effects of cross-
listings in the US. 
Finally, this study evaluates joint significance of alternative theories of the sources of shareholders’ 
wealth effects of international cross-listings and, more importantly, show that the significance of these 
alternative theories changes over time subject to the important changes in the cross-listing environment 
such as the introduction of Euro in the EU and the adoption of SOX in the US. Empirically the market 
segmentation theory of shareholders’ wealth effects of cross-listings holds only for American listings 
and cross-listings within Euro zone. The legal bonding theory is valid for British listings and listings 
within Euro zone. No empirical support is found for the liquidity theory for neither of the sub-samples. 
The investor recognition theory holds only for American listings that take place after the SOX adoption. 
The proximity preference is a valid explanation for the Euro zone listings and for British listings. There 
is empirical evidence that the market timing theory has an explanatory power of shareholders’ wealth 
effects of cross-listings. Also strong empirical support is found for the business strategy theory. 
To conclude, while on average a cross-listing of a European company is a shareholders’ wealth-
enhancing corporate event, there is a large variation in market reaction to a foreign listing. A company 
that is deciding to list on a foreign exchange in order to improve stock shareholders’ wealth must take 
into account market conditions, industry-specific trends and more importantly, carefully weigh the 
listing costs, both direct and indirect, against potential benefits. 
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 Table I.  Potential determinants of shareholders’ wealth effects of international cross-listing 
Proxy variable Level of the 
variable
Expected impact on the 
stock price
Market segmentation 
Correlation of the host and home market index returns Country- specific +
Different periods of time – before and after year 2000 Time- specific Stronger positive before 2000
For Eurozone listings – before and after Euro introduction Time- specific Stronger positive before 
Euro introduction
Legal bonding 
Improvement in accounting standards from cross-listing Country- specific +
Improvement in investor protection from cross-listing Country- specific +
UK listings: Main Market listings vs. AIM listings Time- specific Stronger positive for Main 
Market listings
US listings: before and after SOX adoption Time- specific Stronger positive after SOX 
adoption
Liquidity
Improvement in market liquidity from cross-listing Country- specific +
Investor recognition 
Improvement in analyst coverage intensity from cross-
listing
Country- specific +
Proximity preference 
Geographic proximity measure  (distance in km) Country- specific -
Market timing 
Improvement in GDP per capita from cross-listing Country- specific +
DotCom bubble Time- specific +
Business strategy 
Sales growth Company- specific +
Industry Company- specific variation
Capital raised Listing- specific +
Other determinants
Company size Company- specific +
First foreign listing Listing- specific +
US listings: prior OTC listing Listing- specific -
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Table II.  Explanatory and control variables 
Proxy variable Variable 
level
Definition Data source
Correlation of the 
host and home 
market index 
returns
Country- 
specific
Correlation of the home and host market returns is calculated using 
monthly return of DS Total Market indices over 3 years before the 
cross-listing event
DS Total Market 
indices return data are 
from DataStream
Eurozone listings: 
before and after 
Euro introduction
Time- 
specific
dummy variable =1 if the listing takes place within Eurozone, i.e. both 
host and home markets are within the Eurozone after Euro 
introduction; =0 otherwise
Euro introduction dates 
are from European 
Commision (1)
Improvement in 
accounting 
standards from 
cross-listing
Country- 
specific
An improvement in accounting standards is a positive difference 
between the host market accounting standards index and the 
accounting standards the stock was exposed to prior to the cross-
listing, i.e. maximum of the home market accounting standards index 
and any other foreign host market accounting standards indices 
where the stock was cross-listed previously (2)
Accounting standards 
index data are from La 
Porta et al (1998)
Improvement in 
investor protection 
from cross-listing
Country- 
specific
Legal protection is proxied by legal index calculated as the product 
of the anti-director rights index and the rule-of-law index. An 
improvement in legal protection is a positive difference between the 
host market accounting standards index and the accounting 
standards the stock was exposed to prior to the cross-listing, i.e. 
maximum of the home market accounting standards index and any 
other foreign host market accounting standards indices where the 
stock was cross-listed previously (2)
Anti-director-rights 
index is from Djiankov 
et al (2007), the Rule-
of-law index is from 
Kaufmann et al (2005)
UK listings: Main 
Market listings vs. 
AIM listings
Time- 
specific
dummy variable =1 if the listing takes place in the UK on AIM of LSE; 
=0 otherwise
London stock 
exchange
US listings: before 
and after SOX 
adoption
Time- 
specific
SOX dummy variable =1 if the host market is the US and the listing 
that takes place in year 2002 or after; =0 otherwise
dataset
Improvement in 
market liquidity from 
cross-listing
Country- 
specific
Market liquidity is the annual market turnover ratio calculated as the 
value of all trades of the DS Total Market index over the total market 
capitalization of the index for the year preceding the cross-listing. An 
improvement in market liquidity is a positive log-difference between 
the host market liquidity and the market liquidity the stock was 
exposed to prior to the cross-listing, i.e. maximum of the home market 
liquidity and any other foreign host market liquidity where the stock 
was cross-listed previously (2)
Market capitalization 
and turnover by value 
for DS Total Market 
indices data are from 
DataStream
Improvement in 
analyst coverage 
intensity from cross-
listing
Country- 
specific
Analyst coverage intensity is calculated as the number of 1-year 
EPS analyst estimates per company for each country-year 
proceeding cross-listing. An improvement in analyst coverage 
intensity is a positive log-difference between the host market analyst 
coverage intensity and analyst coverage intensity that the stock was 
exposed to prior to the cross-listing, i.e. maximum of the home market 
analyst coverage intensity and any other foreign host market analyst 
coverage intensity where the stock was cross-listed previously (2)
Data on 1-year EPS 
analyst forecasts are 
from I/B/E/S database
Market segmentation
Legal bonding 
Liquidity
Investor recognition 
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Table II  continued 
Geographic 
distance
Country- 
specific
Natural logarithm of the distance in km between the capital cities of 
host and home markets
Sarkissian and Schill 
(2004)
Improvement in 
GDP per capita 
from cross-listing
Country- 
specific
GDP per capita is calculated as 3-year moving average of GDP per 
capita in current international dollars for 3 years proceeding cross-
listing. An improvement in GDP per capita is a positive log-difference 
between the host market GDP per capita and GDP per capita that the 
stock was exposed to prior to the cross-listing, i.e. maximum of the 
home market GDP per capita and any other foreign host market 
GDP per capita where the stock was cross-listed previously (2)
GDP per capita in 
current international 
dollars data are from 
UN statistics
DotCom bubble Time- 
specific
Dummy variable that equals one if the listing takes place during the 
period of time from Jan 1999 to Mar 2000 and zero otherwise
dataset
Sales growth Company- 
specific
Company total sales (revenue) 3-year growth for the preceding 
year 
Company total sales 
data are from 
DataStream
Industry Company- 
specific
Industry dummy variables based on the FTSE/DJ Industry 
Classification; Basic Materials, Consumer Goods, or Industrials are 
further combined into industry group ‘Manufacturers’; Oil & Gas and 
Utilities are further combined into industry group ‘Natural resources’
Stock level FTSE/DJ 
Industry Classification 
data are from 
DataStream
Capital raised Listing- 
specific
Dummy variable that equals one if the cross-listing involves issue of 
new equity and zero otherwise
Data on capital raising 
activity is from BNY 
and Citibank ADRs 
databases and 
Thomson One Banker 
Equity Deals database
Company size Company- 
specific
Log of the company’s market capitalization (market value of common 
equity) in GB pounds prior to the cross-listing
Market capitalization 
and exchange rates to 
GB pounds data are 
from DataStream
First foreign listing Listing- 
specific
Dummy variable that equals one if the listing is the first foreign listing 
by the company and zero otherwise
dataset
For US listings - 
prior OTC listing
Listing- 
specific
Dummy variable that equals one if the listing takes place in the US 
and the company has had US OTC trading prior to the cross-listing 
and zero otherwise
dataset
Other determinants
Control variables
Market timing 
Proximity preference 
Business strategy 
 
(1) http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/euro/index_en.htm 
(2) improvement in the variable X from cross-listing in n-th foreign host market is calculated as follows:  
∆Xn = max [(Xn – max (Xhome, X1, …, Xn-1)),0] 
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Table III.  Sample description 
This table provides sample distribution by host and home countries and by host country and period of time. Home 
country is the country of domicile of the cross-listing company. Host country is the cross-listing destination 
country. Any European country that contributes at least on cross-listing observation is included in the sample. In 
addition to European countries the US is included in the sample as host country. The total sample consists of 254 
cross-listing announcement events. 
A
U
S
T
R
IA
B
E
L
G
IU
M
B
U
L
G
A
R
IA
D
E
N
M
A
R
K
F
IN
L
A
N
D
F
R
A
N
C
E
G
E
R
M
A
N
Y
IR
E
L
A
N
D
IT
A
L
Y
L
U
X
E
M
B
U
R
G
N
E
T
H
E
R
L
A
N
D
S
N
O
R
W
A
Y
P
O
L
A
N
D
P
O
R
T
U
G
A
L
S
P
A
IN
S
W
E
D
E
N
S
W
IT
Z
E
R
L
A
N
D
U
K
U
S
T
O
T
A
L
%
 o
f 
T
o
ta
l
Home country:
AUSTRIA 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 5 2.0
BELGIUM 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 10 3.9
CZECHREP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0.4
DENMARK 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 5 2.0
FINLAND 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 5 2.0
FRANCE 0 5 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 2 11 25 9.8
GERMANY 3 0 1 0 0 4 0 0 3 0 1 0 0 0 3 1 0 6 15 37 14.6
GREECE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 1.2
HUNGARY 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 4 1.6
IRELAND 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 15 3 18 7.1
ITALY 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 7 2.8
LUXEMBURG 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 0.8
NETHERLANDS 0 3 0 0 0 2 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 7 21 8.3
NORWAY 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 6 10 3.9
POLAND 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0.4
RUSSIA 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 2 12 4.7
SPAIN 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 2 6 2.4
SWEDEN 0 1 0 3 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 3 1 3 16 6.3
SWITZERLAND 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 8 14 5.5
TURKEY 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0.4
UK 0 1 0 0 0 6 3 4 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 33 51 20.1
Period of Time:
1982-1989 0 3 0 1 1 7 7 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 3 3 7 13 47 18.5
1990-1999 3 7 0 2 1 5 9 2 5 3 6 0 0 0 4 1 4 17 45 114 44.9
2000-2007 1 0 1 0 0 7 2 2 1 1 1 0 3 2 0 0 2 24 46 93 36.6
TOTAL 4 10 1 3 2 19 18 4 6 4 8 1 3 2 4 4 9 48 104 254 100
% of Total 1.6 3.9 0.4 1.2 0.8 7.5 7.1 1.6 2.4 1.6 3.1 0.4 1.2 0.8 1.6 1.6 3.5 18.9 40.9 100
Host country
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Table IV.   Host markets characteristics: descriptive statistics 
This table reports mean and median values of market characteristics for three host markets: European markets 
(excluding the UK), the UK and the US. Market liquidity is measured by the annual market turnover ratio 
calculated as the value of all trades of the DS Total Market index over the total market capitalization of the index 
for the year preceding the cross-listing. Analyst coverage intensity is calculated as the number of 1-year EPS 
analyst estimates per company for each country-year proceeding cross-listing. Capital market size is the total 
market value of the DS Total Market index in GB pounds in the year proceeding cross-listing. Accounting 
standards index is from La Porta et al (1998). Legal protection is quantified by legal index calculated as the 
product of the anti-director rights index from Djiankov et al (2007) and the rule-of-law index from Kaufmann et al 
(2005). GDP per capita is calculated as 3-year moving average of GDP per capita in current international dollars 
for 3 years proceeding cross-listing. 
N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median
Capital market size, billion GBP 100 175.8 52.4 48 992.0 1,115.4 104 5,221.9 6,716.2
Market liquidity 75 560.7 463.4 45 845.5 674.1 104 1085.6 941.3
Analyst coverage intensity 89 37.96 22.91 45 20.12 18.79 104 25.39 24.04
Accounting standards 94 65.1 64.0 48 78.0 78.0 104 71.0 71.0
Legal protection 101 5.03 4.62 48 8.75 8.75 104 4.77 4.77
GDP per capita, current USD 102 20,390 18,466 48 22,799 23,315 104 28,516 30,198
Europe UK US
Host market
Host market characteristics
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Table V.   Dependent and explanatory variables: descriptive statistics 
The table reports descriptive statistics - number of observations, mean, median, and percentage of positive observations, of the dependent variable (Panel A) and also of the 
explanatory and control variables (panel B) for the total sample of 254 cross-listing announcement events and for subsamples by host market. Dependent variable is cumulative 
abnormal returns (CARs) estimated as a sum of market-adjusted returns during 21-days (-10,10) days event window around the cross-listing announcement. All explanatory and 
control variables are defined in Table II. 
Theory Variable N Mean Median Min Max
St 
Dev
>0, 
% N Mean Median
>0, 
% N Mean Median
>0, 
% N Mean Median
>0, 
%
Panel A. Dependent variable
CARs 254 0.018*** 0.008 -0.283 0.794 0.107 52.0 102 -0.002 -0.002 47.1 48 0.027** 0.015 58.3 104 0.033** 0.014 53.8
Panel B. Explanatory and control variables
Market segmentation Market correlation 243 0.63 0.67 -0.05 0.94 0.18 94 0.66 0.69 48 0.61 0.63 101 0.61 0.65
Legal bonding Legal protection improvement 229 3.51 0.0 0.0 27.00 5.10 41.5 101 0.58 0.00 36.6 48 4.02 2.52 68.8 104 0.41 0.00 24.0
Legal bonding Accounting standards improvement 229 3.51 0.0 0.0 27.00 5.10 46.7 91 1.81 0.00 26.4 36 9.19 6.50 97.2 102 3.01 0.00 47.1
Liquidity Market liquidity improvement 201 0.72 0.3 0.0 4.43 1.04 65.2 73 0.34 0.00 38.4 33 1.50 1.07 81.8 95 0.74 0.46 80.0
Investor recognition Analyst coverage improvement 231 0.33 0.0 0.0 2.60 0.50 49.8 88 0.34 0.00 43.2 44 0.39 0.23 54.5 99 0.29 0.04 53.5
Proximity preference Geographic distance 240 7.33 7.1 5.1 9.02 1.31 98 6.24 6.14 40 6.41 6.14 102 8.74 8.73
Proximity preference Geographic distance, km 240 3,048 1,209 170 8,261 2,829 98 632 433 40 707 463 102 6286 6198
Market timing GDP per capita improvement 254 0.21 0.12 0.0 1.59 0.31 69.7 102 0.10 0.00 48.0 48 0.33 0.04 56.3 104 0.27 0.26 97.1
Market timing DotCom bubble 254 0.08 0.0 0.0 1.00 0.27 102 0.08 0.00 48 0.00 0.00 104 0.12 0.00
Business strategy Sales growth 211 0.68 0.27 -11.90 19.94 2.11 84 0.97 0.27 37 0.15 0.29 90 0.62 0.31
Business strategy Capital raised 254 0.22 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.41 102 0.12 0.00 48 0.25 0.00 104 0.30 0.00
Control variable Company size 254 7.07 7.44 1.32 11.35 2.07 102 7.01 7.32 48 6.01 6.38 104 7.63 7.80
Control variable Company size, million GBP 254 5,484 1,702 3.75 85,366 10,630 102 3,893 1,515 48 3,079 589 104 8,154 2,448
Control variable First foreign listing 254 0.53 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.50 102 0.46 0.00 48 0.69 1.00 104 0.52 1.00
Control variable US listings: prior OTC 254 0.11 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.32 102 0.00 0.00 48 0.00 0.00 104 0.28 0.00
All host markets Europe UK US
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Table VI.   Shareholders’ wealth effects of cross-listing over time 
The table reports mean cumulative abnormal returns around cross-listing announcement for total sample 
of 254 cross-listing announcement events and for subsamples by different periods of time. Abnormal 
returns are market-adjusted returns with DataStream Total Market index returns in local currency used as 
a proxy for market returns. Cumulative abnormal returns are calculated as sum of abnormal returns over 
the 21-days (-10, 10) days event window. Panel A also reports the number of observations for each 
subsample and t-statistics (in parenthesis). Additionally Panel A reports median, minimum and maxim 
value, and percentage of positive observations. ‘***’ indicates significant at 1%, ‘**’ indicates significant 
at 5% and ‘*’ indicates significant at 10%. 
Subsample N Mean Median Min Max >0, %
All host markets 254 0.018** 0.008 -0.28 0.79 52.0
(2.63) (0.57)
before 2000 157 0.013** 0.013 -0.24 0.21 54.1
(2.12) (2.16)
2000s 97 0.025* -0.001 -0.28 0.79 48.5
(1.74) (0.09)
Host Europe 102 -0.002 -0.002 -0.28 0.21 47.1
(-0.28) (0.8)
before 2000 78 0.003 0.003 -0.24 0.21 50.0
(0.37) (0)
2000s 24 -0.019 -0.006*** -0.28 0.12 37.5
(-1.03) (15.76)
before Euro 91 -0.004 -0.001 -0.28 0.21 47.3
(-0.45) (0.72)
Eurozone 11 0.011 -0.005 -0.10 0.12 45.5
(0.6) (2.09)
Host UK 48 0.027** 0.015** -0.21 0.32 58.3
(2.11) (6.93)
before 2000 24 0.003 -0.002 -0.21 0.13 50.0
(0.22) (0)
2000s 24 0.051** 0.040*** -0.10 0.32 66.7
(2.59) (28.02)
Main Market 39 0.014 0.012** -0.21 0.20 56.4
(1.15) (4.12)
AIM 9 0.084* 0.070*** -0.07 0.32 66.7
(2.08) (28.1)
Host US 104 0.033** 0.014 -0.20 0.79 53.8
(2.49) (1.37)
before 2000 55 0.031** 0.028*** -0.17 0.20 61.8
(2.9) (13.86)
2000s 49 0.035 -0.010 -0.20 0.79 44.9
(1.37) (2.59)
before SOX 83 0.034** 0.023** -0.17 0.55 56.6
(2.67) (4.22)
after SOX 21 0.029 -0.008** -0.20 0.79 42.9
(0.69) (5.15)  
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Table VII.   Determinants of shareholders’ wealth effect of cross-listing 
Variable
Variable 
*Host 
Europe
Variable 
*Host 
UK
Variable 
*Host 
US Variable
Variable 
*Host 
Europe
Variable 
*Host 
UK
Variable 
*Host 
US
Host Europe -0.024 -0.002 -0.049** -0.02
(-0.96) (-0.17) (-2.09) (-1.44)
Host UK 0.068 0.078*** -0.008 0.022
(1.34) (2.98) (-0.28) (0.97)
Host US 0.02 0.035** -0.018 0.013
(0.78) (2.05) (-0.65) (0.59)
Market Correlations -0.005 0.181*** 0.182 -0.201* 0.195*** 0.148 -0.191*
(-0.09) (2.76) (1.40) (-2.27) (2.99) (1.22) (-2.64)
Accounting standards -0.001 -0.001 0.003 0.009** -0.003 0.002 0.01*** -0.004
improvement (-0.66) (-0.70) (0.96) (2.16) (-0.85) (0.84) (3.83) (-1.04)
Legal protection 0.014* 0.015**
improvement (1.79) (2.37)
Market liquidity -0.003 -0.02 -0.032* -0.001 -0.008 -0.033* 0.003
improvement (-0.27) (-0.89) (-1.82) (-0.05) (-0.41) (-1.87) (0.22)
Analayst coverage intensity -0.017 -0.014 -0.009 -0.349* 0.005 -0.012 -0.447*** 0.004
improvement (-0.86) (-0.95) (-0.37) (-1.95) (0.15) (-0.53) (-3.48) (0.13)
Geographic distance -0.04** -0.027** -0.018 -0.056 -0.054
(-2.21) (-2.16) (-0.93) (-0.93) (-0.21)
GDP per capita 0.09 0.064
improvement (1.10) (1.33)
DotCom bubble 0.057* 0.052 0.024 0.075 0.027 0.073
(1.68) (1.48) (0.52) (1.35) (0.58) (1.47)
Sales growth 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.023* 0.003 0.006** 0.023*
(0.81) (0.87) (0.86) (1.30) (1.75) (0.66) (2.32) (1.72)
Industry Financials 0.009 0.034
(0.31) (1.29)
Industry Healthcare 0.008 0.011
(0.18) (0.34)
Industry Manufacturing 0.024 0.036*
(1.03) (1.80)
Industry Resources 0.067** 0.052** 0.10*** 0.069**
(1.95) (2.41) (2.69) (2.16)
Industry Technology 0.026 0.056
(0.61) (1.46)
Capital raised -0.002 0.004 0.26*** -0.029 0.001 0.252*** -0.018
(-0.06) (0.08) (5.58) (-0.93) (0.01) (5.26) (-0.65)
Company size -0.007 -0.007* -0.005 -0.017** -0.005 -0.004 -0.016** -0.007
(-1.51) (-1.83) (-0.68) (-2.05) (-0.63) (-0.64) (-2.25) (-0.92)
First foreign listing 0.005 -0.013 -0.01 0.016
(0.31) (-0.60) (-0.21) (0.66)
US prior OTC -0.033 -0.030 -0.031 -0.024
(-1.40) (-1.35) (-1.11) (-1.02)
Adj-R2 0.033 0.0858
N 154 180 154 154
Variable Model 1 Model 2
Model 3 Model 4
0.110 0.150
 
The table reports the estimation results of regressions of CARs for 21-days (-10,10) days event window 
around cross-listing announcement on a number of potential determinants of shareholders’ wealth effects 
of cross-listing in the multivariate framework. CARs are calculated as sum of abnormal returns over 21-
days event window. Abnormal returns are market-adjusted returns with DataStream Total Market index 
returns in local currency used as a proxy for market returns. The explanatory variables are defined in 
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Table II. Regressions specifications are as follows. Model 1and Model 2: CARi = Σn=EU,UK,US βn Hostn + Σj 
βj  Xi,j + εi, and Model 3 and Model 4: CARi = Σn=EU,UK,US βn Hostn + Σj Σn=EU,UK,US βj,n (Hostn Xi,j) + εi, 
where Hostn - host market dummy variable; Xi - an explanatory variable or, in case of market correlation, 
improvement in accounting standards, improvement in legal investor protection, improvement in GDP per 
capita, geographic proximity, and company size variables, a host market- adjusted variable - εj from the 
regression Varj = Σn=EU,UK,US βn Hostn + εj. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are robust to 
autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity (Newey-West). ‘***’ indicates significant at 1%, ‘**’ indicates 
significant at 5% and ‘*’ indicates significant at 10%. 
 
Table VIII.  Impact of Euro on the determinants of shareholders’ wealth effect of cross-listing 
Variable
Variable 
*Host 
Europe* 
before 
Euro
Variable 
*Host 
Europe* 
Euro 
zone
Variable 
*Host 
UK
Variable 
*Host 
US Variable
Variable 
*Host 
Europe* 
before 
Euro
Variable 
*Host 
Europe* 
Euro 
zone
Variable 
*Host 
UK
Variable 
*Host 
US
Host Europe -0.009 0.002
(-0.5) (0.26)
Host UK 0.05 0.025
(1.31) (0.91)
Host US -0.012 0.006
(-0.64) (0.41)
Market Correlations -0.035 -0.237*** 0.158 -0.203** -0.041 -0.248** 0.155 -0.197**
(-0.49) (-2.7) (1.63) (-2.4) (-0.59) (-2.26) (1.45) (-2.4)
Legal protection 0.007 0.055*** 0.013 -0.01 0.007 0.043*** 0.012 -0.009
improvement (0.54) (3.53) (1.45) (-0.48) (0.57) (3.16) (1.18) (-0.44)
Analayst coverage intensity 0.01 -0.024 0.031 0.01 0.012 -0.013 0.03 0.007
improvement (0.4) (-1.6) (0.47) (0.26) (0.52) (-0.8) (0.45) (0.19)
Geographic distance -0.007 -0.069*** -0.168*** -0.097 -0.007 -0.048** -0.152*** -0.117
(-0.42) (-2.78) (-4.76) (-0.37) (-0.42) (-2.2) (-3.93) (-0.44)
GDP per capita 0.356** 0.016 0.05 0.032 0.359*** -0.032 0.029 0.037
improvement (2.45) (0.37) (0.44) (0.4) (2.94) (-0.89) (0.26) (0.49)
DotCom bubble 0.055 0.084* 0.056 0.086*
(1.01) (1.71) (0.98) (1.71)
Sales growth 0.002 0.029** -0.002 0.024* 0.002 0.013 -0.001 0.024*
(0.55) (2.07) (-0.61) (1.75) (0.43) (1.36) (-0.41) (1.81)
Industry Financials 0.022
(0.99)
Industry Healthcare 0.002
(0.06)
Industry Manufacturing 0.01
(0.53)
Industry Resources 0.098*** 0.083***
(3.13) (3.02)
Industry Technology 0.022
(0.62)
Capital raised -0.002 0.066 0.219*** -0.026 -0.001 0.041 0.198** -0.016
(-0.04) (1.59) (3.00) (-0.87) (-0.02) (0.89) (2.55) (-0.57)
Company size 0.004 -0.027*** 0.0 -0.009 0.006 -0.023** 0.005 -0.01
(0.35) (-2.76) (0.03) (-1.1) (0.73) (-2.47) (0.89) (-1.21)
First foreign listing -0.007 -0.048* -0.048 0.017
(-0.25) (-1.80) (-1.48) (0.74)
Adj-R2
N
Model 1 Model 2
0.0954
184
0.1286
184  
The table reports the estimation results of regressions of cumulative CARs for 21-days (-10,10) days 
event window around cross-listing announcement on a number of potential determinants of shareholders’ 
wealth effects of cross-listing in the multivariate framework. CARs are calculated as sum of abnormal 
returns over 21-days event window. Abnormal returns are market-adjusted returns with DataStream Total 
Market index returns in local currency used as a proxy for market returns. The explanatory variables are 
defined in Table II. Regression specification is as follows: CARi=Σn=EU,UK,US 
βnHostn+ΣDeuroβEU,Deuro(HostEU Xi,j Deuro)+Σj Σn=UK,US βj,n (Hostn Xi,j)+εi, where Xi,j - an explanatory variable 
or, in case of market correlation, improvement in accounting standards, improvement in legal investor 
protection, improvement in GDP per capita, geographic proximity, and company size variables, a host 
market- adjusted variable - εj from the regression Varj = Σn=EU,UK,US βn Hostn + εj; Deuro - one of the two 
dummy variables related to Euro introduction – DbeforeEuro and DEurozone. Standard errors, reported in 
parentheses, are robust to autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity (Newey-West). ‘***’ indicates 
significant at 1%, ‘**’ indicates significant at 5% and ‘*’ indicates significant at 10%. 
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Table IX.  Impact of SOX on the determinants of shareholders’ wealth effect of cross-listing 
Variable
variable 
*Host 
Europe
variable 
*Host 
UK
variable* 
Host US 
*prior 
SOX
variable* 
Host US 
*post 
SOX Variable
variable 
*Host 
Europe
variable 
*Host 
UK
variable
* Host 
US 
*prior 
variable* 
Host US 
*post 
SOX
Host Europe -0.022 -0.025**
(-1.07) (-2.04)
Host UK 0.005 -0.013
(0.13) (-0.70)
Host US 0.0 0.025
(0.02) (1.39)
Market Correlations 0.193*** 0.319** -0.035 -0.131
(3.13) (2.81) (-0.38) (-1.06)
Accounting standards 0.002 0.006* -0.005 0.01*
improvement (0.79) (1.70) (-1.42) (1.66)
Legal protection 0.005 0.011 0.009 0.087
improvement (0.7) (1.12) (0.56) (1.49)
Market liquidity -0.008 0.013 0.002 -0.031
improvement (-0.32) (0.84) (0.16) (-1.23)
Analayst coverage intensity 0.017 -0.018 -0.017 0.205**
improvement (1.23) (-0.47) (-0.8) (2.32)
Geographic distance -0.019 -0.117*** -0.169 0.825
(-1.37) (-3.52) (-0.78) (1.64)
GDP per capita 0.379*** 0.007 0.09 -0.756***
improvement (3.01) (0.09) (1.26) (-2.98)
DotCom bubble 0.024 0.057 0.025 0.067
(0.5) (1.11) (0.54) (1.44)
Sales growth 0.003 0.005 0.031 0.001
(0.72) (1.37) (1.60) (0.23)
Industry Financials 0.028
(1.27)
Industry Healthcare 0.034
(1.19)
Industry Manufacturing 0.027
(1.29)
Industry Resources 0.086*** 0.035
(3.07) (1.29)
Industry Technology 0.052
(1.49)
Capital raised 0.023 0.103* -0.032 -0.052
(0.74) (1.75) (-1.07) (-0.68)
Company size 0.001 -0.004 -0.015 0.017* -0.002 -0.009 -0.022** 0.002
(0.11) (-0.49) (-1.54) (1.65) (-0.37) (-1.02) (-2.15) (0.20)
First foreign listing -0.007 -0.014 0.028 0.069*
(-0.38) (-0.46) (1.34) (1.83)
prior US OTC -0.016 -0.047 -0.001 -0.055**
(-0.58) (-1.55) (-0.02) (-2.27)
Adj-R2
N
Model 1 Model 2
0.0754
218
0.2114
155  
The table reports the estimation results of regressions of cumulative abnormal returns for 21-days (-
10,10) days event window around cross-listing announcement on a number of potential determinants of 
shareholders’ wealth effects of cross-listing in the multivariate framework. CARs are calculated as sum of 
abnormal returns over 21-days event window.  Abnormal returns are market-adjusted returns with 
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DataStream Total Market index returns in local currency used as a proxy for market returns. The 
explanatory variables are defined in Table II. Regression specification is as follows: 
CARi=Σn=EU,UK,US βnHostn+ΣDsoxβUS,Dsox(HostUS Xi,j DSOX)+Σj Σn=EU,UK βj,n (Hostn Xi,j)+εi  
where Xi,j - an explanatory variable or, in case of market correlation, improvement in accounting 
standards, improvement in legal investor protection, improvement in GDP per capita, geographic 
proximity, and company size variables, a host market- adjusted variable - εj from the regression 
Varj = Σn=EU,UK,US βn Hostn + εj; DSOX - one of the two dummy variables related to SOX adoption - 
DbeforeSOX and DafterSOX. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are robust to autocorrelation and 
heteroskedasticity (Newey-West). ‘***’ indicates significant at 1%, ‘**’ indicates significant at 5% and 
‘*’ indicates significant at 10%. 
 
